If American business has successfully penetrated the economies of many societies abroad, it has been no less successful in penetrating noneconomic institutions at home. Governing boards of museums, high-level government offices, and public agency advisory panels are filled with businesspeople, though rarely is their dominance complete. Studies of the occupants of the governing circles of nearly all American institutions, whether public or private nonprofit, invariably reveal that the surest career for entry into such circles is corporate management. The largest single occupational grouping is virtually always business, with the professions a close second; all other occupations, comprising the vast majority of the U.S. labor force, divide among them the few remaining positions. ' While the business presence in governing positions is unimpressive to some observers who view it as largely symbolic, for others it is a crucial datum, indicative of capitalist control of both private and * Direct all communications to Michael Useem; Department of Sociology; Boston University; Boston, MA 02215.
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positions with public and private institutions, there is at least agreement that businesspeople are disproportionately present. Yet both approaches provide little detailed guidance regarding the question of which businesspeople actually assume the leading roles in the governance of these institutions. This can be attributed, in part, to the relative lack of attention in both perspectives to the internal social organization of the capitalist class. Class organization deserves special attention, however, since it can have a decisive bearing on which businesspeople come to assume roles as "spokespersons" for business. And, since businesspeople vary in the kinds of policies they would urge on other institutions given the opportunity, the type of businesspeople who do acquire leadership positions can have implications for the actual policies adopted and, ultimately, the business interests promoted.
Building on recent analyses of the internal social organization of the American capitalist class, this paper proposes that the businesspeople most likely to become involved in the governance of other institutions occupy a distinctive class "location," and new evidence is presented to test the validity of this thesis.
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS
The capitalist class consists of those who are the primary owners and top managers of major business firms; in this paper it will be used interchangeably with business elite. The use of the latter term is purely a matter of linguistic convenience, and it does not connote that the analysis is rooted in an "elitist" theoretical framework. The social organization of the capitalist class, or business elite, consists of the formal and informal networks of economic and social relations among the corporate owners and managers. Institutional governance refers to the occupancy of positions with high influence in, or formal authority over, public and nonprofit private institutions, such as government agencies, schools, and foundations. Positions of influence or authority include governing boards, advisory boards, and top administrative posts.
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The social organization of the business elite is most likely to be determined by the nature of the formal business roles occupied by elite members (e.g., officer, primary owner, or director) and characteristics of the firm with which the position is associated (e.g., the firm's size and product). Other factors, such as government taxation policies and regulation of the securities market, also impinge on elite social organization; and the organization itself possesses a degree of autonomy, allowing for evolution according to its own internal dynamics. Nevertheless, the critical determinant is the structure of the economy, and, thus, the social organization of the business elite should be closely related to the divisions, alliances, and interdependencies among and within the major business firms in American society.
One of the most significant elements of economic organization with implications for class social organization is the sharing of directors by several major corporations. Boards of directors are legally and formally responsible for the operation of a firm and the protection of owner interests (they are elected by the shareholders; Bacon, 1967; Zald, 1969) . Boards vary in size from three to more than 30 seats, though typically they include from 10 to 15 members. Frequently, seats on two or even more boards of directors are occupied by the same person. In 1969, for instance, 8,632 individuals served as directors of the nation's largest 797 financial and nonfinancial corporations, and nearly one-fifth (1,572) of these were "interlocking" directors, serving simultaneously on the boards of at least two of the corporations (Mariolis, 1975:433) . The reasons for the establishment of these interfirm ties have been the subject of considerable analysis, but the origins of the interlocking directorate need not concern us directly here (see Dooley, 1969; Mace, 1971; Burch, 1972; Pfeffer, 1972; Allen, 1974; Bearden et al., 1975; Koenig et al., 1976; Sonquist and Koenig, 1976; Bunting, 1976) . What is of significance for the present argument is that members of the business elite who sit on several boards of directors are placed in a unique position compared with other members of the elite who are responsible for the operation of only. a single firm. Interlocking directors are in a position to recognize c-and help reconcile-the problems of several firms, often operating in very different environments.
Interlocking directors constitute a major part of a broader segment of the capitalist class that, following Zeitlin et al. (1974) , we will label an inner group. The inner group consists of members of the business elite who have significant "connections" with at least several major corporations. Significant connections are those which involve the capacity to shape corporate policy, and include substantial ownership in a firm, service as a director or officer, and close kinship with those holding the former connections. The inner group is not limited to interlocking directors, but interlocking directors do constitute a critical component and we will focus on them here. "Inner group" is a metaphor and the boundary between it and the remainder of the capitalist class is not sharp. Indeed, it is more appropriate to think of its members not as a distinct group at all, but rather as clustered near the end of a continuous differentiating axis within the capitalist class. This axis of inner group centrality ranges from those who are connected with a single major firm to those with two connections, three connections, and at the far end of the axis, many connections.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE INNER GROUP
A fully elaborated analysis of the social organization of the American business elite and the structure of the inner group is not available, but elements of such a formulation have appeared in a number of studies. Outlines of the inner group thesis even date back to Mills's (1956) Power Elite. A major premise of Mills's analysis is that American capitalism is marked by increasing centralization and concentration. This process, in Mills's view, has led to the emergence of a new breed of corporate executives committed to industrywide concerns and not simply the interests of their own firm. Moreover, a fraction of these executives take an even broader view of business problems: "They move from the industrial point of interest and outlook to the interests and outlook of the class of all big corporate property as a whole" (Mills, 1956: 121) . Mills identifies two features of business organization which are primarily responsible for this transition in outlook. First, the investments of a small circle of top managers and owners have become dispersed among a number of firms. As a result, "the executives and owners who are in and of and for this propertied class cannot merely push the narrow interests of each property; their interests become engaged by the whole corporate class" (Mills, 1956: 121) . Second, the emergence of an extensive network of interlocking directorships among the major corporations has also meant that a number of managers have assumed responsibility for the prosperity of several corporations, and thus those holding several directorships constitute "a more sophisticated executive elite which now possesses a certain autonomy from any specific property interest. Its power is the power . . . of classwide property" (Mills, 1956: 122) .
Features of the inner group thesis can also be found in Maurice Zeitlin's (1974; more recent assessment of theory and research on the American capitalist class. Centralizing tendencies akin to those discussed by Mills are, Zeitlin tentatively suggests, generating an overarching unity within the business elite, and prominent among these forces is "the establishment of an effective organizational apparatus of interlocking directorates" cutting across both financial and industrial sectors. This apparatus may be an important ingredient in the heightening of "the cohesiveness of the capitalist class and its capacity for common action and unified policies" (Zeitlin, 1974 (Zeitlin, : 1112 . The national network of owners and managers with diverse corporate investments and positions is viewed by both Mills and Zeitlin as a progressive force in the capitalist class, and one which is increasingly in a position to impose its policies on the remainder of the class. The growing concentration of economic power in this network also has been discerned by a recent Congressional Study of corporation interlocks; indeed it anticipates that the "interlocking management device" could lead to a situation in which "inordinate control over the major part of the U.S. commerce would be concentrated in the hands of [a] few individuals," resulting in the possibility that "an 'inner group' would control the destiny of American commerce" (U.S. Congress, 1965:225-6) .
A dominant theme in these examinations of the American business elite is the special role played by the top managers and primary owners with multifirm connections. Capitalists with ties to several, often disparate companies necessarily become concerned with the joint welfare of all the companies, and these concerns may come to coalesce with the general welfare of a broad spectrum of companies and their owners and managers. "Even more than other large corporation executives," suggest Zeitlin et al. (1974: 4) , those who sit at the center of the web of interlocking directorates must have an outlook and execute policies that, while yet serving particular and more narrow interests, conform to the general interests of the corporate community and of the principal owners of capital within it.
The inner group, in short, may constitute a special segment of the capitalist class, if a class segment can be defined as a subset of class members sharing a social location with partially distinct interests. Though the common concern with capital accumulation unites the inner group with the remainder of the capitalist class, at the same time the inner group's greater stake in class-wide interests sets it apart.
There is already some systematic evidence to enhance our confidence that the inner group does, indeed, constitute a distinct class segment. As a consequence of the divergence of the secondary interests of the inner group from those of the remainder of the class, members of this class segment can be expected to evolve partially distinctive ideologies, social circles, and patterns of intergenerational reproduction. Though 
THE INNER GROUP AND INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE
A distinctive political role for the inner group is expected as well. While the political activity of a class segment can take many forms, this investigation will concentrate on a single political element (and, thus, our discussion is largely restricted to it). We will focus on the rate of business participation in institutional governance. It is hypothesized that the inner group will be substantially overrepresented, compared with other class members, in positions with direct influence on the policies of other institutions. The inner group's higher degree of political engagement is anticipated for several reasons.
First, the multiple corporate connections of inner group members tend to foster the formation of informal transcorporate networks. The heightened visibility associated with involvement in these networks should make inner group members more likely candidates for openings on governing boards and advisory bodies. The multiple corporate connections also place inner group members in an exceptionally good position to help mobilize the resources of many firms on behalf of policies they favor-and institutions whose governance they assist-making inner group members preferable to other businessmen when appointments to positions of governance are decided.
Second, inner group members also are expected to be especially prominent in institutional governance because of the integrative position the inner group holds within the capitalist class. Like other social classes, this class contains major economic cleavages that can generate sharply opposed views on the policies most appropriate for other institutions to pursue. Certain federal government policies, for instance, may benefit large firms at the expense of smaller firms, banks at the expense of industrials, and certain sectors, such as oil or military goods, at the expense of others. These divisions over secondary economic interests can engender conflicts that potentially threaten the primary economic interests shared by all corporations. By virtue of their connections with several corporations and their involvement in a network of those associated with still other corporations, inner group members are uniquely situated to identify the policies that would foster the more general interests of many, if not most, major corporations. Thus, inner group members may constitute attractive "compromise" candidates when various segments of the capitalist class compete over who among their ranks would be appropriate business leaders. From the standpoint of the outside institutions as well, the capacity of the inner group to transcend the parochial interest of specific firms and sectors makes inner group members especially suitable business representatives.
Third, by virtue of their stronger connection with the primary holders of corporate ownership, inner group members are also more likely to be promoted for governance positions. Evidence from both the U.S. and Chile indicates that, compared with other members of the business elite, those holding multiple corporate directorships are more likely to be primary owners themselves or members of extended families with widespread holdings (Villarejo, 1%2; Burch, 1972; Zeitlin et al., 1974; Soref, 1976; Useem, 1978a) . The reasons for this intertwining of position and ownership need not be entered into here, but one consequence is that inner group members who are not themselves primary owners are especially likely to receive primary owner political backing. And, to the extent that primary owners, both those who also serve as multiple directors and those who do not, exercise disproportionate influence on decisions within the corporate community because of their dominant wealth position, their support and power should further heighten the probability that inner group members become overrepresented on the rosters of institutional governance.
While previous studies have not explicitly examined the role of the inner group in American institutional governance, research on the occupants of top federal positions consistently reveals that they are over-drawn from the ranks of directors and executives of the largest corporations (Mills, 1956; Miliband, 1969; Kolko, 1969; Domhoff, 1970; Mintz, 1975; Freitag, 1975; Dye, 1976) . Many of the directors and executives of major companies hold multifirm connections, and it is possible that these findings largely reflect disproportionate recruitment of inner group members, rather than members of the business elite per se, into top government positions. This question has not been directly addressed in previous empirical work on the U.S. (see Zeitlin et al., 1976 , for empirical work on a related question in Chile), however, and it will be the primary focus of the present inquiry.
In sum, then, prior research suggests that the inner group does constitute a distinctive segment of the capitalist class, and it has been argued here that the position of the inner group in the social organization of the class is likely to lead its members to take a particularly active role in institutional governance. It is expected, therefore, that interlocking directors will more often occupy oversight positions in public and private nonprofit institutions than will other members of the business elite. The requirement that each of our directors appear on the membership rosters of at least two of the organizations results, of course, in a sharp underestimate of the complete membership of the directors, since those with only a single membership are not counted. In this paper, membership in a given number of business policy associations refers to the number within the present data set, not the true number of memberships, which, in an unknown number of cases, will be one larger than the number reported here.
3 A director was considered to be an executive of a firm if he or she listed his or her primary position with the firm as any of the following: chairman of the board, vice-chairman of the board, president, chief 
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The percentages of the corporate directors who participate in the governance of at least one organization in each of the seven areas appear in Table 2 . The overall level of participation ranges widely by type of organization, varying from 10%o for economic development organizations to 50% for colleges and universities (explanation for the considerable interinstitutional variation in overall participation rates would be a useful undertaking but is beyond the scope of the present paper). As expected, the participation rate within an institutional sector varies by inner group centrality, with single directors typically displaying the lowest rate of involvement, multiple directors evidencing the highest rate, and double and triple directors showing intermediate levels. For economic development organizations, for instance, the rates range from 6% for single directors to 10, 9, and 15%, respectively, for double, triple, and multiple directors. The ratio of the multiple director participation rate to that of single directors is 2.44 for economic development organizations, the highest observed, and only 1.14 for charitable organizations, the lowest observed. Multiple directors are more involved than single directors in all areas, though for several areas the differences are very small. For other areas, however, most notably economic development, cultural, and research and scientific organizations, the differences are pronounced.
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ADVISORY BODIES
The second area of institutional governance, participation in government advisory bodies, is assessed in several ways. Pre-1976 service on a federal advisory committee was identified using the director's Who's Who biography. This source is problematic, however, since the year of the advisory service was frequently not reported and some of the service, though probably only a fraction, was likely to have antedated the directors' election to their corporate board(s). Accordingly, the director's service on federal advisory committees during 1976 was also identified, using the U.S. Senate subcommittee compilation. Finally, advisory work with local and state government units was assessed using Who's Who information.
As shown in Table 3 , 17% of the corporate directors report at least some pre-1976 experience as advisors to the federal government; 6% were serving on federal advisory committees in 1976, and 22% indicate that they had served as an advisor to state or local government agencies at some time. The federal agencies most frequently the recipients of the directors' advice were, not surprisingly, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Interior, and State; presidential panels and special commissions were also frequented by the directors.
A positive association between inner group centrality and participation in governance is, once again, observed. The percentage of the directors with pre-1976 federal advisory experience varied from 14 of the single directors to 22, 23, and 31, respectively, of the double, triple, and multiple directors. Similarly, the percentages with federal service in 1976 range from 3 for single directors to 5, 9, and 11 for the successively more central groups of directors. The differentiation of the ad- 
PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR BUSINESS POLICY ASSOCIATIONS
The final area of institutional governance is participation in the work of major business policy associations. Business trade associations abound, of course, and most are organized to defend the interests of a particular type of industry, such as oil or steel, or to promote business interests in a local region. Yet a number have been established to provide a forum for the discussion and articulation of policies that affect most major companies, regardless of sector or region. These associations usually draw their members from the top ranks of a broad range of corporations scattered throughout the country; in some cases their rosters also include academics, attorneys, and other professionals actively concerned with the business world. Case studies of several major business associations suggest that they play an important role in establishing a common business position on contemporary issues, especially in the area of public policy (e.g., see Eakins, 1%6; Domhoff, 1970; Shoup, 1975; Hirsch, 1975; Fournier, 1976; Bonacich and Domhoff, 1977) . Since the associations serve as a significant interface between business and government, direct participation in their affairs can have an important impact on the nature of public policies collectively promoted or opposed by business. The multifirm connections of inner group members should make them particularly valuable and forceful contributors to such organizations, and it is expected, therefore, that inner group centrality should be strongly associated with participation in the affairs of these business policy groups.
Rates of participation in the Council on Foreign Relations, Committee for Economic Development, Business Council (all closely identified with major corporations) and nine other associations are shown in Table 4 . Overall, 12% of the directors participate in the affairs of at least one association, but when the rates are broken down by number of directorships, pronounced variations from this average become evident. The proportion of single directors active in one association is less than 1%; the percentages for 
CORPORATE RESOURCES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Earlier it was argued that an observed association between inner group centrality and participation in governance would be expected for at least several reasons. First, by virtue of oversight responsibilities for several major corporations, inner group members are in a position to mobilize greater resources on behalf of favored policies and institutions than are single directors. From the standpoint of the institution seeking business participation, inner group members can provide greater support for, and exert more influence on behalf of, the institution than can businesspeople associated with only a single firm. Second, participation in the boards of directors of several firms helps generate informal contacts with other multiple directors, and a national social network of multiple directors is likely to form.4 Again, from the standpoint of the institution seeking corporate representatives, members of this network can provide better social contacts and a broader understanding of business interests than would outsiders. Thus, the multiple directors' greater access to corporate resources and involvement in transcorporate, national social circles of top business leaders make them more attractive candidates for institutional governance than are other businesspeople. Moreover, the multiple directors' better corporate and network connections should give them a competitive edge over other directors when seeking to participate in the affairs of other institutions. They would be able to mobilize more firms and more business leaders to back their candidacy than would other, less connected and less visible corporate directors.
Still other factors were previously argued to contribute to the greater governance participation rate of multiple directors. But in any case, if corporate resource and social network factors do play a major role as expected, several observable patterns are anticipated. First, among directors with a fixed number of directorships, those serving on the boards of larger corporations are in a position to mobilize greater resources than are those associated with a similar number of smaller companies. Thus, holding the number of directorships constant, we should expect to see a larger average corporation size among those participating in institutional governance than among nonparticipants. Second, multiple directors are expected to be more heavily engaged in social networks among their own kind than single directors, and involvement in these networks should, in turn, independently enhance the directors' participation rates. Though our data do not permit detailed assessment of these hypotheses, at least elements can be checked with the information available.
A. Corporate Resources
While corporate size is a reasonably good measure of corporate resources, the size of the 797 firms is measured within the seven distinct sectors utilizing varying criteria (sales, assets, and operating revenue). The resources of all firms cannot, therefore, be readily assessed according to sales or any other single dimension of size. Of several alternatives considered, 4Other points of contact among the multiple directors surely contribute as well to the formation of this network. Limited available evidence suggests that inner group members are more likely to be descendents of business elite families than are other members of the business elite. And other studies indicate that this social origin is often associated with a set of opportunities favorable to the formation of enduring social contacts among those of similar heritage: invitations to elite-sponsored social events, visits to exclusive vacation communities, attendance at elite preparatory schools and universities, and induction into exclusive societies and social clubs (Mills, 1956; Baltzell, 1964; Lundberg, 1968; Domhoff, 1970; Useem and Miller, 1975) . the following procedure for establishing a common size dimension offered the most suitable approach (the alternatives yielded results little different from those reported here). The rank position of the corporations within each sector is used as a base for a general resource index. The 500 industrials were ranked from one to 500 according to firm sales. The sales figures for 1969 ranged from slightly more than $100 million for those ranked near 500 to between $10 and $20 billion for those near the top (General Motors is ranked one). The sales rank of these firms is similar to a logrithmic transformation of their dollar sales figures. The rank position of the fifty firms in each of the other six sectors, where rank position is established according to sales, assets, or operating revenues (depending on the sector), is simply set as equivalent to the rank of the largest 50 industrials. The commercial bank and insurance company with greatest assets, for instance, are both assigned a rank of one (in effect equating a directorship with either of them to a directorship with General Motors), while the 50th largest bank and insurance company are each assigned a rank of 50. The average rank of the firms of the directors is then calculated separately for double, triple, and quadruple directors 'too few directors with more than four directorships were available for separate reliable analysis). Finally, the average of these averages is obtained for groups of directors who are involved and uninvolved in seven areas of governance that previously evidenced strong associations with inner group centrality.
The average ranks are shown in Table 5 . The mean rank of the firms of double directors who were not involved in any economic development organization stood at 128, while the mean rank of those who did participate was 98, for an average difference of 30 rank positions. Similarly, among those with three directorships, the average rank of the corporations of economic development participants was 19 positions larger than the rank of the corporations of nonparticipants; the corre- The social network hypothesis suggested that the observed association between inner group centrality and participation in institutional governance is also partly the result of greater involvement of multiple directors, compared with single directors, in social circles among their own kind. Network participation cannot be directly assessed, but membership in the business policy associations does provide one indirect indicator of network involvement. Activity with such associations bring members into personal contact with the officers and directors of numerous large corporations located throughout the economy and the country. The resulting networks of acquaintanceship provide their members with an assessment of one another's leadership capacities and views on matters of public policy. Along with the ties of personal obligation which accompany the formation of social networks, these elements enable members more forcefully and effectively to promote each other for openings in the governing bodies of other institutions.
We have already seen that the number of corporate directorships and rate of participation in business policy associations are related, implying, if the previous assumptions are correct, that multiple directors are more active than other directors in the social networks that should bring them into prominence. To examine whether business policy association participation is in turn related to participation in other areas of institutional governance, we examine these participation rates as a function of business group membership. Table 6 displays the percentages of the directors who were active in six areas of governance, broken down into those who were members in no, one, and two or more business groups. The percentages 5 Since most (77%) of those with two to four directorships held these with firms in at least two sectors, the present analysis could not be undertaken separately within each of the seven sectors (a procedure that would have negated the need for the assumption that firms of similar rank in different sectors could be considered to represent equivalent resources). However, a sufficient number of the twoboard directors with both positions located in the industrial sector was available to permit analysis limited to this group alone (N=170). The results of this more limited analysis are generally consistent with those reported above for the full analysis. -advisor-1976 variable, for which the numbers of cases are 1,758, 149, and %, respectively. show the expected pattern for all areas except state or local government advisory service. Of the directors without business association membership, only 8%, for instance, were involved with economic development organizations, whereas the percentages for those with one and at least two associations are 17 and 21, respectively. The ratio of the participation rates of those with two or more business association memberships to those with none is 2.50 for economic development organizations; 1.59 for cultural organizations; 2.03 for research or scientific organizations; 2.29 for pre-1976 federal advisory service; and 2.65 for 1976 federal advisory work. The ratio for state or local government advisory service, however, is less than one.
It is evident, then, that number of directorships is strongly associated with participation in business policy organizations, and that this participation is strongly associated with involvement in other areas of institutional governance. If indeed network involvement, as indexed by business association membership, is a factor in the multiple directors' preferential selection for institutional governance, the degree of association between the number of directorships and institutional governance should be reduced when business association membership is held constant. This possibility can be examined with multivariate table analysis, but a more compact form of presenting the results can be achieved using correlational analysis, and this will be employed here. The variables also are made more compact for the analysis, as follows: the economic development, cultural, and research or scientific organization variables, in dichotomized form, are summed to form a civic governance variable (ranging from zero, for no involvements, to three, for participation in all three areas); the two federal government advisory variables, also in dichotomized form, are summed to form a government advisor scale (ranging from zero, for no service, to two, representing both pre-1976 and 1976 advisory service); directorships consists of the number of corporate directorships held (with more than four scored as four);
and business association represents the number of business policy group memberships (with more than two coded as two). Because state or local government advisory service already has been found to be unrelated to business association membership, it is not included in the analysis.
The relevant simple correlations among these variables are displayed in Table 7 . The correlation of directorships with business association is .26, with civic governance it is .14, and with government advisor it is .12. These figures are consistent with results obtained from the previous bivariate table analyses. Business association also is seen to correlate with the two governance dimensions (.17 and .18). If business association does, indeed, account for a substantial fraction of the relationship between directorships and the two governance dimensions, the correlation between directorships and each governance dimension should be reduced when business association is introduced as the control variable in a partial correlation. This does occur, as shown in Table  7 . The partial correlations of directorships with civic governance and government advisor, net of business association, are .11 and .08, respectively; these represent 73 and 65% of the simple correlations.
It appears, therefore, that social networks, as indexed by involvement in business policy association affairs, do facilitate the involvement of multiple directors in the governance of other institutions. The business policy associations would appear not only to help develop common business positions on matters of public debate, but also to provide a screening mechanism for selecting businesspeople to help oversee the affairs of other institutions. Inner group members disproportionately participate in such oversight in part because they disproportionately participate in business policy associations and the social networks they generate. The business policy associations examined here, all national in orientation and scope, do not appear to be responsible for screening members for state or local government advisory work. It may be that other, more locally oriented business groups, are responsible for this process at the local government level.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented here indicates that, in regard to the placement of corporate directors in positions of governance over nonbusiness institutions, the capitalist class is differentiated, as expected, along an axis of inner group centrality. In three distinct areas of governance, variant participation rates were observed as a function of position on the inner group axis. Multiple directors were more likely to be involved than single directors in the governance of several types of nonprofit private organizations (especially economic development, cultural, and research or scientific organizations), as advisors to local, state and national government agencies, and as members of major business policy associations. The participation rates of multiple directors frequently were observed to be more than twice those of single directors, with double and triple directors usually exhibiting intermediate rates. The consistency of these patterns across many areas of institutional governance provides tentative confirmation for the thesis that inner group members are generally more likely to serve as business representatives in nonbusiness governing bodies and positions than are other business people.
The disproportionate involvement of inner group members in institutional governance was expected, in part, because of their greater capacity to mobilize corporate resources and because of the likelihood that they would be more involved in a national, transcorporate social network of corporate directors. It was anticipated that these factors would result in inner group members more often being promoted for institutional governance positions by other members of the business elite, and in inner group members being more desirable business representatives from the standpoint of the recipient institution. The limited evidence considered here is consistent with this line of reasoning. Indexing corporate resources by the average rank size of the firms with which the directors were connected, and using membership in major business policy associations as an index of social network involvement, we found that both hypothesized factors did appear to be responsi-ble, in part, for the overrepresentation of inner group members.
Several limitations on the validity and generalizability of these results, however, should be noted. First, a select set of corporate directors was studied, and it is possible, though improbable in my opinion, that the analysis of a set of directors drawn from a larger, more comprehensive list of companies would yield different conclusions. Second, more potentially problematic is the quality of the indicators employed in the study. The difficulty of acquiring precise, detailed information on the characteristics of a large set of corporate directors, their firms, and their participation in the governance of a variety of institutions necessitated reliance on available but often imprecise indicators for the variables of interest. No direct measure of social network participation for the more than 2,000 directors could be developed, for instance, leading to the use of an acceptable though clearly less than ideal proxy measure, business association membership. Our measures offer only a first approximation to the empirical relations among the variables of concern. It is expected, however, that more exact indicators would yield results generally consistent with those reported here while perhaps differing substantially in detail. For some variables, radically different empirical approaches may be required to acquire the direct and precise information needed. Perrucci and Pilisuk's (1970) method of obtaining social network information through personal interviews with multiple directors in a single community might be extended to the national level, though cost may prohibit the approach of more than a small subsample of the directors studied here.
A third limitation relates to what was not examined in this paper. As Alford and Friedland (1975) have argued, power cannot necessarily be equated with participation, although there is usually a strong relationship between these analytically separable dimensions. Thus, it should be cautioned that the overrepresentation of inner group members in governance does not automatically imply that they are decisively shaping the policies of the subject Even if the corporate directors in the present study do exercise considerable power over the institutions in whose governance they participate, it remains to be demonstrated that their power is exercised on behalf of anything but the best interests of the subject institution. It can be reasoned that inner group members are more likely than other members of the business elite to advocate the general concerns of business, and that both groups are likely to take more pro-business stands than do nonbusiness people involved in institutional governance. And while these arguments are relatively persuasive and evidence from other studies can be cited to bolster them, it remains to be shown that the corporate directors studied here do forcefully represent the interests of their class, or at least a major fraction of it, when they participate in the governance of other institutions. The thesis is plausible, yet unproven. The present paper, then, has explored only one part of the business-institutional governance relationship, and speculation about the operations of the other parts awaits verification.
But even short of verification of the other elements of the businessinstitutional governance relationship, the present evidence points toward the need for a revision in our thinking about the internal social organization of the American capitalist class. Business is differentiated along an axis of inner group centrality, and this element of internal organization appears to have a major bearing on how business is structured to express and represent its interests in places where other institutions are making decisions that can vitally affect business.
The political salience of the inner group axis stems in all likelihood, from several elements in the relationships among major corporations, their managers, and primary owners. Firms and those responsible for them are, of course, sharply divided by interfirm and intersectoral competition and rivalries. And the divergent economic circumstances faced by those overseeing firms operating in different environments add further division, especially when owners and managers specify the policies they would urge upon government agencies, cultural organizations, universities, and other institutions. Without suitable means for reconciling these antagonisms and identifying the common concerns of all business, political leadership for the capitalist class is unlikely to emerge. The divisive tendencies may then result in public policies which benefit some sectors or firms but do little to advance the general welfare of most major corporations and the class as a whole.
Though not self-consciously designed to solve these problems, several formal and informal relationships among corporations and their owners and managers nonetheless are likely to contribute toward their solution. Among these relationships are a network of kinship and acquaintanceship among corporate managers and owners spanning many corporations (Whitley, 1973) ; the diversification of institutional and family corporate holdings (Lundberg, 1968) ; the integrative role of commercial banks and other financial institutions (Kotz, 1978) ; social associations transcending firm, sector, and region, such as business policy organizations and exclusive metropolitan social clubs (Baltzell, 1964) ; and the interlocking directorate studied here. The social forces behind the formation of each of these integrative relationships require separate analysis, but, whatever their origins, the consequences are likely to include a set of transcorporate networks that draw together the otherwise disparate units of the business elite. These disparate units include not only individuals but also specialized elite networks organized within metropolitan areas and within business sectors. Available research indicates that these contexts generate their own, specialized inner circles (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970; Ingham, 1978; Ratcliff et al., 1979) , and it is probable that these and other types of localized networks provide many of the constitutive elements for the national, intercorporate networks that help to unite the entire class.
Concentrating on only a single strand of these various integrative networks, the present analysis tentatively confirms the thesis that this strand is a source of the "leading organizers of [the] system of class-wide property" (Zeitlin, 1976: 901) . Those most central to the interlocking directorate are observed to be those most often involved in representing business interests, presumably shorn of many of their more parochial elements, to other institutions. A more precise identification of the "leading organizers" of the capitalist class than that achieved here would be possible if evidence were obtained on the other relationships contributing to the integration of the class and its firms. Unfortunately, adequate data on kinship, ownership, and other intercorporate networks is far less accessible, for the present at least, than is information on the network of corporate directorships. Were such information to become accessible, it can be speculated that those most central to these various networks are also those most active politically both within and outside the corporate community. Combined with the results of the present analysis, such findings would help to establish a more general thesis that the American capitalist class is characterized by a substantial degree of centralized internal social organization, and the centralization, however faulty it may be in specific instances, provides a means for the entire class to distill and promote its most general class-wide interests.
As a result, the government and other institutions are not simply presented with a set of unaggregated demands when businesspeople enter their policy-making circles. Rather, the businesspeople who most often serve already represent a degree of reconciliation of the conflicting and contradictory interests dividing the capitalist class. The corporate community itself, then, appears at least partially capable of identifying its class-wide interests. While the state and other institutions may still play a critical role in "the liberation" of general interests from the "fragmented, stubborn, and shortsighted empirical interests of single capital units" (Offe, 1973: 111) , the class may achieve a degree of prior interest "liberation" on its own.
This general thesis must be treated for the moment, however, more as a guide for further inquiry than an accepted description of the organizational coherence of the American capitalist class. Moreover, whatever the extent of class centralization eventually identified, there is reason to believe that it may be less pronounced in the U.S. than in Britain, France, and other advanced capitalist democracies where the business elite's geographic concentration is far greater, elite institutions such as universities and social clubs are more exclusive, and the level of organization and militancy of labor and socialist movements is much stronger.
